Positional Preferences, Endogenous Growth, and Optimal Income- and Consumption Taxation by Ghosh, Sugata & Wendner, Ronald
MPRA
Munich Personal RePEc Archive
Positional Preferences, Endogenous
Growth, and Optimal Income- and
Consumption Taxation
Sugata Ghosh and Ronald Wendner
Brunel University, U.K., University of Graz, Austria
24 November 2014
Online at https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/60337/
MPRA Paper No. 60337, posted 2 December 2014 02:03 UTC
 1 
Positional Preferences, Endogenous Growth, 
and Optimal Income- and Consumption Taxation1 
 
 
Sugata Ghosh a 
Ronald Wendner b,* 
 
  a Department of Economics and Finance, Brunel University, U.K. 
  b Department of Economics, University of Graz, Austria 
 
 
24 November 2014 
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1. Introduction 
 
This paper analyzes the impact of positional preferences, exhibiting conspicuous consumption 
and conspicuous wealth, on optimal consumption- and income-taxes, in the context of an 
endogenous growth model.  
 
Positional preferences refer to the situation in which consumption and wealth of an individual 
have a direct effect on the utility of other individuals.2 Such preferences were already studied 
by ancient philosophers,3 and more recently by political philosophers and classical economists 
such as Adam Smith or Thorstein Veblen.4 Meanwhile, a large body of literature has 
established significant empirical evidence for positional preferences.5     
 
Within a growth set-up, our consumers’ utility thus depends not only on the level of their own 
consumption but also on how their consumption compares to some standard, which is referred 
to as the reference level. There are two specific versions of this: the consumer’s reference 
level could be his own past consumption, or it could be the consumption of others, a la 
Duesenberry (1949). These two versions are referred to as the inward- and outward-looking 
versions, respectively, by Carroll et al. (1997). The inward version is adopted by Carroll et al. 
(2000), Monteiro et al. (2013) following Ryder and Heal (1973), etc., while the outward 
version is considered by Liu and Turnovsky (2005), Turnovsky and Monteiro (2007), 
Wendner (2011), among others. Finally, both types of consumption reference levels are 
                                                
2 Different terms for positional preferences have been used in the literature, with slightly differing meanings. 
They include status preferences, status consumption, conspicuous consumption, conspicuous wealth, relative 
consumption, relative wealth, keeping up/catching up with the Joneses preferences, jealousy/envy, external 
habits, or simply consumption externality. In this article, we use these terms synonymously, though we focus on 
the relative wealth aspect. 
3 That social distinction or status is an important motivation of human (and non-human) behavior. was already 
shown by Darwin (1871), who emphasized sexual selection besides natural selection: “To spread across the 
population, genes of sexual species not only need to survive in their natural and social environment, but also 
need to be or appear a more attractive mating partner than their same sex competitors.” (Truyts, 2010, p.137). 
Clearly, Darwin was not the first to think about social distinction. Philosophers have thought about the issue of 
social distinction more than 2400 years ago. Plato, in his The Republic (Book II) wrote: “Since ... appearance 
tyrannizes over truth and is lord of happiness, to appearance I must devote myself.” This passage astoundingly 
resembles Darwin's argument on sexual selection. 
4 Adam Smith (1759) devoted a section to conspicuous consumption in his Theory of Moral Sentiments. “The 
poor man's son ... when he begins to look around him, admires the condition of the rich. He finds the cottage of 
his father too small ... It appears in his fancy like the life of some superior rank of beings, and, in order to arrive 
at it, he devotes himself for ever to the pursuit of wealth and greatness.” (Smith, 1759, p. 181). Likewise, in his 
Theory of the Leisure Class, Veblen (1899) emphasized the quest for status – via conspicuous consumption and 
wealth – as an important component of the pursuit of self-interest. Veblen, thus, argues: “Conspicuous 
consumption of valuable goods is a means of reputability to the gentleman of leisure.” (Veblen, 1899, p. 64). 
5 The literature emphasizes three approaches: survey experimental studies (Johansson-Stenman et al. 2002, 2006, 
Solnik and Hemenway 1998, 2005), econometric studies (Ferrer-i-Carbonell 2005, Luttmer 2005), and revealed 
preference studies (Glazer and Conrad 1996). An excellent review is provided by Truyts (2010). 
 3 
considered by Carroll et al. (1997), Alvarez-Cuadrado et al. (2004), and Alonso-Carrera et al. 
(2005). In this article, we adopt the second of the two specifications, as we are more 
interested in the externality aspects of consumer behavior (and, to a lesser extent, producer 
behavior), and issues about how far tax/subsidy policies in a decentralized economy can 
replicate the social optimum, and it is clear that only in the ‘outward’ case is the reference 
level an externality (as such an agent ignores the effect that his own consumption has on 
utility via the average consumption). 
 
Importantly, in our paper, wealth in the form of capital is an argument in agents’ welfare 
function, as in Zou (1994, 1995), Corneo and Jeanne (1997), Futagami and Shibata (1998), 
Nakamoto (2009), among others, which creates a ‘wealth externality’ effect.6 We show in our 
paper that higher positional preferences via conspicuous consumption and conspicuous wealth 
have a direct and positive impact on the endogenous growth rate, providing the intertemporal 
elasticity of substitution is less than 1.7 Moreover, we demonstrate that if wealth is present in 
the consumer’s utility function,8 then the consumption externality does have a distortionary 
effect, even if labor supply is exogenous. For plausible parameter values, the decentralized 
economy here achieves a lower growth rate compared to what could be attained via a notional 
central planner,9 and consequently we characterize the optimal fiscal policy that would enable 
the first-best to be attained, as in Liu and Turnovsky (2005). Given that here the private return 
on capital falls below its socially optimal return, a positive tax on consumption helps offset 
this deviation. As positional concerns for consumption rise, both optimal growth and welfare 
rise, which necessitates an even lower income tax rate and a higher consumption tax rate for 
the decentralized economy: this, together with the higher complementary public spending, 
raises the growth rate and also improves welfare.  
 
                                                
6 The initial idea is due to Zou (1994), who argues that the incentive for accumulating capital lies not only in 
maximizing long-run consumption, but also to increase wealth, which in itself adds to agents’ utility. Zou’s 
model, in turn, is based on ‘the theory of the spirit of capitalism’ by Weber (1958), and the mathematical model 
of Kurz (1968). By adding a ‘cultural’ dimension to existing models, his set-up is able to embody all the 
contributions of both traditional and new growth theories. 
7 In Futagami and Shibata (1998), if all consumers are identical, the long-run balanced growth rate is positively 
related to the degree of status preference (but this may not hold with heterogeneous agents). 
8 Cole et al. (1992) consider status preferences affecting capital accumulation, but do not include status directly 
in the utility function. 
9 Likewise, in Liu and Turnovsky (2005), Section 6, where endogenous growth – but not via public capital – is 
considered, a positive production externality leads to the decentralized growth rate falling short of the socially 
optimal rate (with inelastic labour). Here, consumption externalities affect the magnitude of the distortion caused 
by the production externality. By contrast, within an endogenous growth set-up, Corneo and Jeanne (1997) show 
that the quest for status may result in a competitive economy growing too fast relative to the social optimum if 
the marginal status utility of relative wealth exceeds a certain threshold. 
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It is important to compare and contrast our findings with those of other studies on the topic in 
the context of a key result that emerges from much of the related literature: in the absence of a 
labour-leisure choice, a consumption externality does not have any impact on the steady state 
equilibrium of a decentralized economy in a neoclassical growth model (see, for example, 
Rauscher (1997), Fisher and Hof (2000), Liu and Turnovsky (2005)).10 If, however, as in 
Turnovsky and Monteiro (2007), there is also a positive (negative) production externality, 
then the steady-state equilibrium capital stock and output are below (above) their respective 
optimal levels, while the equilibrium output–capital ratio is too high (low), so a consumption 
externality does introduce distortions in the presence of a production externality in a growing 
economy.11 In Carroll et al. (1997), who consider a simple Rebelo-type AK technology, the 
more individuals care about how consumption compares to the reference level, and the less 
they care about the absolute level of consumption, the higher will be the growth rate of 
consumption in the steady state. The introduction of consumption externalities leads to the 
economy approaching its balanced growth equilibrium along a transitional path, this 
sluggishness in adjustment being caused by the consumption externality (i.e., in spite of the 
AK technology). However, as demonstrated by Alvarez-Cuadrado et al. (2004), the 
transitional adjustment paths may exhibit non-monotonic behaviour if the production function 
is neoclassical rather than AK-type. This is because then the transitional dynamics are 
governed by two opposing forces: one generated by preferences (the status effect) and the 
other by technology (diminishing returns to capital). It is important to note that in our 
framework, a consumption externality of the type considered above does not have a 
distortionary effect on the economy, regardless of the presence of the production externality; 
however, the presence of wealth or a wealth externality alters the situation. 
 
In models with consumption externalities but with elastic labour supply, the decentralized 
economy diverges from the social optimum in the long-run, as in Dupor and Liu (2003), Liu 
and Turnovsky (2005), and Turnovsky and Monteiro (2007). In the first of these papers, an 
increase in aggregate consumption may raise the marginal utility of individual consumption 
relative to leisure when others consume more. At the same time, higher per capita 
consumption (holding individual consumption fixed) can trigger jealousy (admiration) so that 
individual utility falls (rises). In Liu and Turnovsky (2005), if labour supply is elastic, a 
                                                
10 With exogenous technical change, the consumption externality - by affecting the elasticity of marginal utility 
of consumption - does impact on the equilibrium (see Wendner, 2011). For a similar result, but with the 
reference level comprising current and past consumption, see Alvarez-Cuadrado et al. (2004). 
11 The same is true in Liu and Turnovsky (2005) when a production externality is introduced. 
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negative (positive) consumption externality leads to over- (under-) consumption and over- 
(under-) supply of capital and labour, relative to the optimum, in the steady state. With 
endogenous labour supply, in Turnovsky and Monteiro (2007), the consumption externality 
affects the steady state even in the absence of any production externality. This is because it 
affects the marginal valuation of consumption, which in turn changes the optimal utility value 
of the marginal product of labour. Thus, consumption distortion results in distortion in the 
labour-leisure trade-off and therefore creates production inefficiency. In our paper, labour 
supply is inelastic, and there is a production externality, but the decentralised equilibrium 
differs from the social optimum mainly because agents derive utility from their own wealth 
relative to a wealth reference level (in addition to a consumption externality), necessitating 
the use of corrective income and consumption taxes mentioned earlier. In this respect, our 
paper comes closest perhaps to Nakamoto (2009), where also labour supply is inelastic. 
However, despite this, in both set-ups the distortionary effect of consumption externalities 
persists in the long-run because of wealth preferences. A key difference between Nakamoto 
(2009) and our paper is that ours is an endogenous growth model where output is produced by 
public (in addition to private) capital, while he considers a neoclassical growth model.  
 
As is clear from the discussion above, an important aspect of papers examining externality 
issues in consumption (and production) is to study optimal fiscal policy, i.e., to devise 
appropriate tax/subsidy policies that enable the decentralized economy to replicate the social 
optimum. In Alonso-Carrera et al. (2005), a consumption externality makes the decentralized 
equilibrium allocation inefficient, which can be corrected by either a consumption tax or an 
income tax. If consumers’ willingness to shift current consumption to the future is sub-
optimally low (high), then optimal fiscal policy consists of either a decreasing (an increasing) 
sequence of consumption taxes or a subsidy (tax) on income/output. On the other hand, in 
Nakamoto (2009), the reason for the decentralized outcome to differ from the first-best is due 
to wealth preference: when households feel jealousy (admiration) about others’ consumption, 
the long-run levels of consumption and the capital stock are lower (higher) than the social 
optimum, calling for a positive (negative) consumption tax and a negative (positive) income 
tax. In our case, if wealth is an argument in the utility function, and providing the desire to 
raise consumption is different from the desire to increase saving (wealth), the optimal 
consumption and income tax rates differ from zero even if government spending is chosen 
optimally. In the case where the private return on capital falls below its socially optimal 
return, a positive tax on consumption helps offset this deviation; consequently, a larger weight 
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on consumption relative to the average results in even larger divergence between private and 
social returns, and therefore calls for an even larger value of the consumption tax rate to 
compensate. 
 
The value added of our paper arises also from the five fiscal policy experiments that we 
conduct in the penultimate section, and their effects on the economy along the balanced 
growth as well as transition paths. Three of those experiments involve an increase in public 
capital spending financed by lump-sum, income or consumption taxes, while the remaining 
two are about an income and consumption tax increase, respectively (without a corresponding 
spending increase). Our results indicate that public spending positively affects both growth 
and welfare in the steady state, and does so quite strongly, and so demonstrates that the 
production externality clearly dominates the consumption externalities in this regard. The 
latter is reflected also in the ‘decisive’ way in which some of the key variables adjust along 
the transition path in response to the first three fiscal shocks. In addition, it can be observed 
that for all the policy experiments considered, the transitional paths of all the important 
variables are monotonic. 
 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 develops the model, emphasizing the 
preference structure and characterizing the steady state. In Section 3 we derive the social 
optimum, identify the fiscal policies that would enable the decentralized economy to replicate 
the first-best scenario, and link this with growth and welfare. In Section 4, the growth and 
welfare effects of five fiscal policy shocks are studied, both along the balanced growth path 
and in transiting from one steady state to another. Finally, Section 5 concludes the paper. 
 
2. The Model 
 
We consider a dynamic general equilibrium model of a closed economy that allows for fully 
endogenous growth. Time is considered to be continuous. The source of endogeneity of 
growth is a public good, public capital  
Kg , that serves as an input to production. There is a 
large number of households and firms, the respective number of which we normalize to unity. 
Households are homogeneous and exhibit positional preferences. They derive utility not only 
from own consumption but also from own consumption relative to some consumption 
reference level, and from own wealth relative to some wealth reference level. 
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2.1 Preferences 
 
The representative household has preferences for consumption, relative consumption, and 
relative wealth. Relative consumption is given by individual consumption relative to some 
consumption reference level,  C :  C / C . As households are homogeneous in our framework, 
we consider the economy’s average consumption level as a natural choice for a household’s 
consumption reference level.12 By the same token, relative wealth is given by individual 
wealth relative to the average wealth in the economy,  K :  K / K . That is, conspicuous 
consumption (CC, in the following) is captured by a relative consumption term, and 
conspicuous wealth (CW, in the following) is captured by a relative wealth term in the 
instantaneous utility function. Both  C  and  K  are considered exogenous by individual 
households. 
 
The instantaneous utility function is given by: 
 
 
u C, K , C
C
, K
K
⎛
⎝⎜
⎞
⎠⎟
= C1−ηc C
C
⎛
⎝⎜
⎞
⎠⎟
ηc
K1−ηk K
K
⎛
⎝⎜
⎞
⎠⎟
ηk⎛
⎝
⎜
⎞
⎠
⎟
ξ
= CC −ηc K ξ K −ηkξ , 0 ≤ηi <1, i ∈ c,k{ } , ξ ≥ 0  (1) 
 
where parameters  ηi  represent marginal degrees of positionality (Johansson-Stenman et al. 
2002). A marginal degree of positionality reflects the share of marginal utility of individual 
consumption (or wealth) that is due to the fact that own consumption (or wealth) raises the 
ratio  C / C   or  K / K  ceteris paribus. There is robust empirical evidence that  ηi > 0  with 
estimates found in the range of  0.2,0.8⎡⎣ ⎤⎦  (cf. Johansson-Stenman et al. 2002, Solnik and 
Hemenway 1998, 2005, Wendner and Goulder 2008). Parameter ξ  indexes the strength of 
CW. If  ξ = 0 , the household does not exhibit positional preferences with respect to wealth. 
However, if  ξ > 0 , the household’s preferences exhibit CW in addition to CC.  
 
The intertemporal utility function is given by: 
 
                                                
12 In a model with heterogeneous households, a household's consumption reference level may be specified quite 
more generally (cf. Eckerstorfer and Wendner 2013).  
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U C, K , C
C
, K
K
⎛
⎝⎜
⎞
⎠⎟
= 1
γ0
∞
∫ u C, K ,
C
C
, K
K
⎛
⎝⎜
⎞
⎠⎟
γ
e−βtdt = 1
γ0
∞
∫ CC −ηc K ξ K −ηkξ⎡⎣ ⎤⎦
γ
e−βtdt , − ∞ < γ ≤1   (2) 
 
The household has a constant rate of time preference  β > 0  and an instantaneous CRRA 
utility function with absolute elasticity of marginal utility of consumption equal to  (1−γ ) . 
Facing given market prices, reference levels  C  and  K , and equipped with perfect foresight 
the household chooses a plan 
 
C(t){ }t=0
∞
 so as to 
 
 
 
maxU C, K , C
C
, K
K
⎛
⎝⎜
⎞
⎠⎟
s.t.
!K = (1−τ y )Y − (1+τ c )C −T −δ k K ,
lim
t→∞
Kte
− rs0
t
∫ ds ≥ 0.
  (3) 
 
The first constraint in (3) is the household’s flow budget constraint, where,  
τ y  and  τ c  are 
respectively the income- and consumption tax rate, and  T  denotes lump sum taxes. In our 
framework, the labor-leisure decision is exogenous. Under standard assumptions (in the 
absence of CC and CW), the optimal consumption tax is nil. Below, we are interested in the 
mechanisms affecting the optimal consumption tax rate in the presence of CC and CW. 
 
The second constraint in (3) is the No-Ponzi-Game condition. In equilibrium, the 
transversality condition requires the No-Ponzi-Game condition to hold with strict equality. 
 
2.2 Technology 
 
A homogeneous output,  Y , is produced by private and public capital using a CES technology: 
 
 
 
Y = A αK −ρ + (1−α )Kg
−ρ⎡⎣ ⎤⎦
−1/ρ
, 0 <α <1, −1< ρ < ∞ ,   (4) 
 
where  K  denotes private capital. The elasticity of substitution between private capital and the 
public good is given by  1/ (1+ ρ) . To ensure positivity of growth rates along the BGP (see 
below), we assume 
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  α A−δ k > β  . (A.1) 
 
The assumption roughly implies that the rate of interest strictly exceeds the rate of time 
preference. 
 
The public good evolves according to: 
 
 
 
!Kg = G −δ g Kg , G = gY , 0 < δ g <1 , (5) 
 
where  G  represents the flow of public expenditures for public capital and  
δ g  is the rate of 
depreciation of public capital. The flow of public expenditures is a fixed share  g  of output.  
 
Let  C  denote aggregate consumption. As we consider a closed economy, the aggregate 
resource constraint is given by: 
 
  
!K = Y −C −G −δ k K , (6) 
 
where  δ k  is the rate of depreciation of private capital.  
 
2.3 Macroeconomic Dynamics and the Steady State 
 
Let the current-value Hamiltonian be given by: 
 
 
 
H = 1
γ
CC −ηc K ξ K −ηkξ⎡⎣ ⎤⎦
γ
+ λ (1−τ y )Y − (1+τ c )C −T −δ k K⎡⎣ ⎤⎦  , (7) 
 
where  C  is a control variable,  K  is a state variable, and λ  is a costate variable. An interior 
solution satisfies the following necessary first-order conditions.  
 
 
 
∂H
∂C
= Cγ −1C −ηcγ K ξγ K −ηkξγ − λ(1+τ c ) = 0   (8) 
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∂H
∂K
= ξCγ C −ηcγ K ξγ −1K −ηkξγ + λ (1−τ y )YK −δ k⎡⎣ ⎤⎦ = βλ −
!λ  , (9) 
 
where  YK  is the partial derivative of  Y  with respect to  K .  
 
Ex post, as households are homogeneous,  C = C  and  K = K . The first-order conditions then 
imply: 
  C
γ (1−ηc )−1K ξγ (1−ηk ) = λ(1+τ c )  , (10) 
 
 
ξCγ (1−ηc )K ξγ (1−ηk )−1 + λ (1−τ y )YK −δ k⎡⎣ ⎤⎦ = βλ −
!λ . (11) 
 
Next, we define  c ≡ C / K ,  y ≡ Y / K ,  
z ≡ Kg / K . Considering (10) in (11) yields    
 
 
ξ c(1+τ c )+ (1−τ y )YK −δ k = β −
!λ
λ
 . (12) 
Differentiating gives 
 
 
(γ (1−ηc )−1)
!C
C
+ (ξγ (1−ηk ))((1− g)y − c −δ k ) =
!λ
λ
 , (13) 
where we took (6) into account. (13) in (12) and considering  !c / c = !C / C − !K / K  yields: 
 
 
 
!c
c
=
(1−ηk )ξγ ((1− g)y − c −δ k )+ ξ(1+τ c )c + (1−τ y )YK − β −δ k
1− (1−ηc )γ
− (1− g)y + c +δ k ,  (14) 
 
where (4) implies that 
 
y = A α + (1−α )z−ρ⎡⎣ ⎤⎦
−1/ρ
, and  YK =α A
−ρ y1+ρ . Finally, from (5) and 
(6), it follows:  
 
 
!z
z
= g y
z
−δ g − (1− g)y + c +δ k . (15) 
 
Differential equations (14) and (15) represent the model’s two-dimensional dynamic system 
in the dynamic variables  c  and  z .  
 
The economy will, in a steady state, follow a balanced growth path (BGP). Along the BGP 
 !c = !z = 0 , and  C ,  K ,  
Kg  and  Y  grow at the same constant endogenous growth rate. 
 
 11 
In the following, we employ the following parameter restriction, which ensures positivity of 
 (c, z)  along the BGP. 
 
 
 
Ag(1−α )−1/ρ > δ g ≥ Ag . (A.2) 
 
Proposition 1. (Existence and Stability)   
(1) Assume (A.1) and (A.2). Then, a non-trivial steady state  (c, z)  exists and is unique. The 
steady state is associated with a BGP along which  
C, K , Kg  and  Y  grow with the constant 
growth rate  
Γ = g y / z −δ g .  
(2) The unique steady state is a saddle point and is saddle-point stable. 
 
Proof.   See the Appendix.  
 
Parameter restrictions (A.1) and (A.2) are sufficient, not necessary, for a steady state to exist. 
In fact, as shown in the Appendix,  0 < z <1  along the BGP. Assumption (A.1) requires the 
rate of interest to exceed the pure rate of time preference at  z = 1. Assumption (A.2) requires 
the rate of growth of public capital investment to be strictly positive at  z = 0  (left hand 
inequality) and negative at  z = 1 (right hand inequality). 
 
In the Appendix it is shown that the Jacobian matrix associated with the dynamic system, 
evaluated in the steady state, has one eigenvalue with negative real part and one positive 
eigenvalue. There is one predetermined variable,  z , and one jump variable,  c . Thus, the 
saddle point is saddle path stable. 
 
Ceteris paribus, the endogenous growth rate,  
Γ = g y / z −δ g , rises in g, due to the production 
externality. The following proposition shows how positional preferences impact on the 
endogenous growth rate.  
 
Proposition 2. (Positional Preferences and Endogenous Growth)   
Assume (A.1) and (A.2). Then, positional preferences ( ηc > 0  or  ηk > 0 ) impact on the 
endogenous balanced-growth growth rate, Γ , independently of the presence of a production 
externality.  Specifically, 
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∂Γ
∂ηi
≷0⇔γ ≶ 0, i∈ c,k{ }  . 
 
Proof.   See the Appendix.  
 
We consider the case  γ < 0  (the intertemporal elasticity of substitution is less than one) to be 
the main case. For this case, positional preferences raise the endogenous growth rate, 
irrespective of whether or not individual households exhibit a concern for relative wealth or 
for relative consumption. Intuitively, consider a rise in  ηc  (a parallel argument can be given 
for a rise in  ηk ). From (14), if  γ < 0 , it is seen that ceteris paribus a rise in  ηc  leads an 
individual household to raise her steady state consumption growth rate (in the pursue to 
outshine the others). A higher steady state consumption growth rate is attained by higher 
savings initially, as of the increase in  ηc . As higher saving raises a household’s capital one-
by-one, it increases output and consumption by less than one-by-one. As a consequence, both 
the consumption-to-capital ratio,  c , as well as the public capital-to capital ratio,  z , decline. 
As  
Γ = g y / z −δ g , and  ( y / z)  declines in z, the endogenous BGP-growth rate increases as of 
a rise in  ηc . 
 
In order to derive optimal consumption- and income tax rates under CC and CW we will now 
consider the socially optimal allocation. From this allocation, by comparing with the market 
economy’s allocation, we derive optimal consumption- and income tax rates for the BGP 
below. 
 
 
3. The Social Optimum 
 
We adopt the primal approach to derive the socially optimal allocation. In contrast to private 
households, the government takes into account both externalities, CC and CW. The current 
value Hamiltonian of the government’s problem is given by: 
 
 
 
H = 1
γ
C1−ηc K ξ (1−ηk )⎡⎣ ⎤⎦
γ
+ λ (1− g)Y −C −δ k K⎡⎣ ⎤⎦ + µ gY −δ g Kg⎡⎣ ⎤⎦  , (16) 
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where  C  is a costate variable, and  
K , Kg  are state variables. An interior solution satisfies the 
following necessary first-order conditions: 
 
 
 
∂H
∂C
= (1−ηc )C
γ (1−ηc )−1K ξγ (1−ηk ) − λ = 0  , (17) 
 
 
∂H
∂K
= ξ(1−ηk )C
(1−ηc )γ K ξγ (1−ηk )−1 + λ[(1− g)YK −δ k ]+ µ gYK = βλ − !λ  , (18) 
 
 
∂H
∂Kg
= λ(1− g)YKg + µ(gYKg −δ g ) = βµ − !µ  . (19) 
 
Let  q ≡ µ / λ . Then from (19) it directly follows that   
 
 
 
!q
q
+ 1
q
(1− g − qg)YKg −δ g = β −
!λ
λ
 , (20) 
 
where 
 
YKg = (1−α )A
−ρ ( y / z)1+ρ . First-order condition (17) in (18) yields: 
 
 
 
ξ(1−ηk )
1−ηc
c + (1− g + qg)YK −δ k = β −
!λ
λ
 . (21) 
 
Combining (20) with (21) yields a differential equation in  q , where both partial derivatives of 
 Y  are functions of  z  (only): 
 
 
!q
q
=
ξ(1−ηk )
1−ηc
c + (1− g + qg)YK −δ k −
1
q
(1− g − qg)YKg +δ g  . (22) 
 
As in the section above,  
 
 
 
!z
z
= g y
z
−δ g − (1− g)y + c +δ k  . (23) 
 
Finally, the dynamic equation for  c  is found by differentiating (17) with respect to time and 
taking (21) into account for  !λ / λ : 
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!c
c
=
ξγ (1−ηk )[(1− g)y − c −δ k ]+ ξ(1−ηk ) / (1−ηc )c + (1− g + qg)YK − (β +δ k )
1−γ (1−ηc )
− (1− g)y + c +δ k .
  (24) 
 
For a given government expenditure share for public investment, the three-dimensional 
dynamical system of the economy is given by the differential equations (22) – (24) in the 
dynamic variables  (c,q, z) .  
 
However, if the government follows its optimal policy,  ∂H / ∂g = 0 , implying  q = 1  and 
 !q = 0 . In this case, the dynamical system becomes two-dimensional (as for the market 
economy). Again, the economy will, in a steady state, follow a BGP. Along the BGP 
 !c = !z = 0 , and  C ,  K ,  
Kg  and  Y  grow at the same constant endogenous growth rate. In a 
parallel way as presented for Proposition 1, one can establish existence of a unique, 
nontrivial, saddle point stable steady state. We are now ready to consider the optimal taxation 
results. 
 
3.1 Optimal Taxation 
 
Given that income and consumption taxes impact the economy in very different ways, what 
tax and expenditure rates in the decentralized economy will replicate the social planner’s 
optimum? Let these choices be represented by the vector (gˆ,τˆ y ,τˆ c ) . Then, by definition, this 
vector is a description of optimal fiscal policy in the decentralized economy. To determine 
these optimal choices, we will compare the equilibrium outcome in the decentralized and 
centrally planned economies. Since our focus is on the two distortionary tax rates, we will 
assume that g is set optimally at gˆ , given by the solution to (22) – (24), and is appropriately 
financed by some combination of non-distortionary lump-sum taxes. Given gˆ , a comparison 
of (14) and (24) yields the following long-run optimal relationship between the income and 
consumption tax rates: 
 
 τ y =
τ c + (ηk −ηc ) (1−ηc )[ ]ξc
αA−ρy1+ρ  . (25) 
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From (25), we see that only one tax rate can be chosen independently to attain the first-best 
equilibrium. This implies that the government has a choice in the ‘mix’ between the income 
and consumption tax rates: if one is set arbitrarily, the other automatically adjusts to satisfy 
(25) to replicate the first-best allocation. But what kind of a policy ‘mix’ should the 
government choose? Even if one individual tax instrument is at its non-optimal level, (25) 
suggests that the government can still adjust the other appropriately to attain the social 
optimum. 
To see this flexibility in designing optimal fiscal policy, note that, in (25), the income and 
consumption tax rates are positively related. A useful benchmark, then, is to derive the tax on 
income, say, τˆ y , when τ c = 0 . Given this benchmark rate, we can evaluate the role of the 
consumption-based tax when the actual income tax rate differs from its benchmark rate, τˆ y . 
Likewise, we can evaluate the role of the income-based tax when the actual consumption tax 
rate differs from its benchmark rate, τˆ c . When consumption (income-) taxes are absent, that 
is, τ c = 0  (that is  τ y = 0 ), the optimal taxes on income and consumption are given by 
 
 
τˆ y =
(ηk −ηc ) (1−ηc )[ ]ξc
αA−ρy1+ρ ,
τˆ c =
ηc −ηk
1−ηc
, ξ > 0.
 . (26) 
Now suppose that the actual income tax rate is different from its benchmark rate derived in 
(26). The government has a choice to use the consumption tax to correct for this deviation, yet 
attain the first-best optimum without altering the income tax rate. To see this, subtract (26) 
from (25): 
 
 τ c =
αA−ρy1+ρ
ξc (τ y − τˆ y ), ξ > 0  . (27) 
 
Therefore, when τ y > τˆ y , the government must introduce a positive consumption tax to attain 
the first-best equilibrium. On the other hand, if τ y < τˆ y , a consumption subsidy (τ c < 0  ) is 
the appropriate corrective fiscal instrument. These results are summarized by 
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Proposition 3. (Optimal Taxation). 
Assume (A1) and (A2). Then, the first-best allocation is attained through a mix of income- and 
consumption taxation as given by 
 τ y =
τ c + (ηk −ηc ) (1−ηc )[ ]ξc
αA−ρy1+ρ . 
The income tax rate differs from zero only if wealth is an argument in the household utility 
function. 
 
Proof.    Follows immediately from comparing (24) with (14). 
 
In general (ξ > 0 ), income- or consumption taxes are needed to correct for the distortions 
caused by the concern for relative wealth and relative consumption. As numerical simulations 
show (see below), the optimal tax rates may become quite large. 
 
Corollary 1. 
If wealth is not an argument of the household utility function, and labor supply is inelastic, 
then the consumption externality by itself does not cause any distortionary effect in spite of 
the presence of a production externality. This holds true, even if g  is not chosen optimally. 
 
A related argument in a framework in which the engine of growth stems from private capital 
accumulation is provided by Liu and Turnovsky (2005). We extend this argument to a 
framework in which the public capital stock serves as an engine of growth. Liu and 
Turnovsky (2005, p.1121) show that their consumption externality alone does not introduce a 
distortion. However, in the presence of an additional production externality, the consumption 
externality exacerbates or reduces the distortion created by the production externality. In 
contrast, in our framework, as long as  ξ = 0 , the consumption externality does not have a 
distortionary effect, regardless of the presence of the production externality, and regardless of 
whether or not g is optimally chosen.13 
 
 
 
 
                                                
13 If g is not optimally chosen, though, then the optimal income tax rate becomes  τ y = g(1− q) . 
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Proposition 4. (Distortionary effects of the consumption externalities) 
If wealth is an argument of the household utility function ( ξ > 0 ), and labor supply is 
inelastic, then the consumption externality by itself does cause a distortionary effect, even in 
the absence of a production externality. 
 
In the presence of wealth in the household utility function, the Keynes-Ramsey rule does not 
hold anymore. This is because the derivative of the Hamiltonian with respect to the capital 
stock contains a term, the marginal utility of wealth, that itself depends on the consumption 
externality. Individuals do not internalize this externality, whereas the government does so. 
As a consequence, the so modified Keynes-Ramsey rule requires the government to choose a 
capital stock that is affected by the strength of the consumption externality. Notice that this 
result also holds if preferences exhibit no concern for relative wealth (ξ > 0, ηk = 0 ). The 
Keynes-Ramsey rule requires to be even more strongly modified if ηk  is strictly positive in 
addition to ξ > 0 . That is, the marginal benefit from consuming an additional unit of capital 
today rises not only by a preference for relative wealth in addition to wealth per se. In a 
different framework, in which there are no externalities in production and therefore growth is 
not endogenous and in which households do not have a concern for relative wealth, Nakamoto 
(2009) points out a parallel argument. 
 
Corollary 2.  
If g  is chosen optimally, the optimal tax rates τˆ y  and τˆ c  differ from zero if and only if 
 (i) ξ > 0  and (ii) ηk ≠ ηc .  
 
The corollary unravels three important characteristics of the optimal tax program derived 
above. As long as ξ = 0  (wealth does not enter the utility function), the concern for relative 
consumption is non-distortionary. Hence, the optimal tax rates equal zero. However, if ξ > 0 , 
the optimal tax rates differ from zero if and only if ηk ≠ ηc . In this case, the opposing forces 
of the consumption- and wealth externalities, which cause an increase in consumption and a 
corresponding reduction in saving (wealth), do not cancel out. Intuitively, if ηk =ηc , the 
desire to raise consumption is exactly matched by the desire to increase saving (wealth). In 
this case, the consumption externalities do not lead to a change in household behavior relative 
to the social optimum. Therefore, even if ξ > 0 , the social planner does not need a tax 
instrument to correct for any distortion. 
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To get a flavor of how the optimal values of the income-and consumption taxes are affected 
by the key behavioral parameters of the model (ηc ,ηk ,ξ ), we calculate τˆ y  and τˆ c  based on 
benchmark parameter values commonly employed in the literature. Preference parameters are 
assigned the following values: β = 0.04, γ = −1.5 . The latter parameter gives rise to an 
intertemporal elasticity of substitution equal to 1/ (1−γ ) = 0.4 , as suggested by Guvenen 
(2006). Technology parameters are assigned the following values: 
A = 0.6, α = 0.8, ρ = 1, δ g = δ k = 0.08 . First, following common practice, we use the total 
factor productivity, A, as a scale parameter to help us obtain plausible values for the growth 
rate, and a value of 0.6 looks reasonable. The value of α (which is the elasticity of private 
capital) is set at 0.8, which is plausible if private capital is meant to include human capital, as 
in Romer (1986). This also implies that the elasticity of public capital is 0.2, which is 
consistent with the empirical evidence provided by Gramlich (1994). There is not much 
empirical evidence on the elasticity of substitution between private and public capital (Lynde 
and Richmond, 1993, provides an exception); ρ=1, which corresponds to this elasticity being 
equal to 1/ (1+ ρ) = 0.5 , is one of the values for this parameter chosen by Chatterjee and 
Ghosh (2011). Finally, the depreciation rates for the private and public capital stocks are each 
set at 8% in line with Chatterjee and Ghosh (2011).14   
 
Based on these benchmark values, we focus on the impact of different values of the key 
parameters (ηc ,ηk ,ξ ) on the optimal tax rates ( τˆ c ,τˆ y ) as well as on the optimal level of 
government spending, g . 
 
In Table 1, we focus on the following preferred benchmark values for the key behavioral 
parameters: (ηc , ηk , ξ ) = (0.3, 0.25, 0.5) . Empirical evidence supports the chosen values of 
the strength of positional concerns. Compiling several empirical studies, Wendner and 
Goulder (2008) find that η1  and η2  are found to fall into the range ηi ∈[0.2, 0.4] . Other 
studies find empirical evidence for even larger values of  ηi  (cf. Johansson-Stenman et al. 
2002, Solnik and Hemenway 1998, 2005). Newer empirical studies corroborate this evidence 
                                                
14 See also Baxter and King (1993), where the value for the rate of depreciation of the capital stock in the US is 
chosen at 10%. 
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(Alvarez-Cuadrado et al. 2012, Dynan and Ravina 2007). Panel C shows that a rise in ξ  has a 
minor impact on (τˆ c ,g)  and only slightly raises τˆ y . 
 
Table 1. The optimal levels of (g,τˆ y ,τˆ c )  when respectively ηc , ηk  and ξ  are gradually 
increased 
Panel A. 
ηk = 0, ξ = 0.5  
ηc = 0   ηc = 0.1  ηc = 0.2  ηc = 0.3  ηc = 0.4  ηc = 0.5  
Optimal g 0.1528 0.1572 0.1622 0.1679 0.1745 0.1821 
τˆ c  (τ y = 0 )  0.0000 0.1111 0.2500 0.4286 0.6667 1.0000 
τˆ y  (τ c = 0 )  0.0000 -0.0416 -0.0896 -0.1458 -0.2124 -0.2927 
Panel B. 
ηc = 0, ξ = 0.5  
ηk = 0  ηk = 0.1 ηk = 0.2  ηk = 0.3  ηk = 0.4  ηk = 0.5  
Optimal g 0.1528 0.1540 0.1552 0.1564 0.1577 0.1589 
τˆ c  (τ y = 0 )  0.0000 -0.1000 -0.2000 -0.3000 -0.4000 -0.5000 
τˆ y  (τ c = 0 )  0.0000 0.0386 0.0770 0.1152 0.1532 0.1910 
Panel C. 
ηc = 0.3, ηk = 0.25  
ξ = 0  ξ = 0.1  ξ = 0.2  ξ = 0.3  ξ = 0.4  ξ = 0.5  
Optimal g 0.1841 0.1817 0.1792 0.1768 0.1743 0.1719 
τˆ c  (τ y = 0 )  0.0000 0.0714 0.0714 0.0714 0.0714 0.0714 
τˆ y  (τ c = 0 )  0.0000 -0.0048 -0.0096 -0.0144 -0.0193 -0.0241 
Note. (c, z,g)  are simultaneously derived employing the benchmark parameter values. τˆ c  is 
implicitly given by (25) for τ y = 0 .  
 
A more comprehensive sensitivity analysis with respect to ξ  reveals the following robust 
patterns. The optimal consumption tax rate is not affected by ξ , as seen in (26). The impact 
of the consumption externalities on the optimal income tax becomes stronger with ξ . The 
impact of ξ  on optimal g is small irrespective of (ηc , ηk ) .15 
 
 
                                                
15 These results are not reported but are available from the authors upon request. 
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3.2 Growth and Welfare along the Balanced Growth Path 
 
The endogenous growth rate along the BGP, Γ  (decentralized) together with (c, z)  is derived 
from (14) – (15) in the decentralized framework. Without loss of generality, we consider the 
baseline income- and consumption tax rates to be zero. We assume that g = 0.05 .16  The 
endogenous growth rate for the social optimum Γ  (optimal) together with (c, z,g)  is derived 
from (22) – (24). 
 
In the Appendix, we show that for both, the decentralized as well as the centralized 
framework, the steady state welfare expression is given by: 
 
 
 
W0 =
cγ (1−ηc )
γ β −γ Γ (1−ηc )+ ξ(1−ηk )⎡⎣ ⎤⎦{ }
 . (28) 
 
Welfare expression (28) is an implicit function of  c  and  Γ(z) . Both variables,  (c, z) , 
generally differ between the decentralized and centralized economies. Consequently, so do 
growth rates and welfare.  
 
A rise in  ηi  impacts upon both, the growth rate Γ  and  c . Unfortunately, as seen in (28), the 
effects on welfare  W0  are ambiguous. For example, if  γ < 0 , a rise in  ηc  raises both the 
numerator and the denominator. The sign of the steady state welfare effect then depends on 
the respective changes in  c  and Γ .  
 
To gain more insight, we employ numerical simulations (Table 2). Specifically, we gradually 
raise respectively  ηc  and  ηk  and calculate the associated (decentralized and optimal) growth 
rates and welfare levels.  
 
For the social optimum, as ηc  rises, g rises, but (c, z, y)  fall, and growth rises. The fall in c is 
greater than the fall in y (and there is higher g as well). Looking at it the other way, the rise in 
g and fall in z more than compensate for the fall in y. Optimal growth and optimal welfare, 
both rise, following the rise in ηc . Optimal fiscal policy in this case calls for a lower τˆ y  
                                                
16 The pre-shock value for g is set at 5% also in Chatterjee and Ghosh (2011).  
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(which is negative) and a higher τˆ c  as the value of ηc  is raised. So higher ηc  results in a 
lower income tax rate (higher income subsidy in our case) and a higher subsidy on private 
saving (a higher consumption tax rate), which together with the higher complementary public 
spending, raises the growth rate, and also improves welfare (because of the growth effect, 
despite the lower consumption-to-capital ratio). 
 
Table 2. Growth rates ( Γ ) and welfare (W) along the BGP when ηc  and ηk  are 
gradually increased 
Panel A. 
ηk = 0, ξ = 0.5  
ηc = 0   ηc = 0.1  ηc = 0.2  ηc = 0.3  ηc = 0.4  ηc = 0.5  
Γ  (decentralized)  0.0166 0.0168 0.0171 0.0174 0.0177 0.0180 
Γ  (optimal) 0.0899 0.0959 0.1028 0.1108 0.1201 0.1311 
W (decentralized) -138.34 -108.92 -85.68 -67.33 -52.87 -41.48 
W (optimal) -24.946 -21.269 -18.089 -15.335 -12.946 -10.866 
Panel B. 
ηc = 0, ξ = 0.5  
ηk = 0  ηk = 0.1 ηk = 0.2  ηk = 0.3  ηk = 0.4  ηk = 0.5  
Γ  (decentralized)  0.0166 0.0167 0.0168 0.0170 0.0171 0.0172 
Γ  (optimal) 0.0899 0.0896 0.0894 0.0891 0.0887 0.0883 
W (decentralized) -138.34 -141.09 -143.95 -146.96 -150.11 -153.42 
W (optimal) -24.946 -25.415 -25.913 -26.443 -27.009 -27.614 
Note. τ c = τ y = 0 , g = 0.05 .  
 
Also, for the social optimum, as ηk  rises, g, c, z, y rise, and growth falls. The rise in c is 
greater than the rise in y (and there is higher g as well). Looking at it the other way, although 
g and y rise, z rises more, which leads to growth falling. Optimal growth and optimal welfare, 
both fall, following the rise in ηk . (This contrasts with optimal growth and optimal welfare, 
both rising, following a rise in ηc .) Optimal fiscal policy in this case calls for a higher τˆ y  and 
a lower τˆ c  (which is negative) as the value of ηk  is raised. So higher ηk  results in a higher 
income tax rate and higher tax on private saving due to a lower consumption tax rate (higher 
consumption subsidy in our case), which together lead to lower growth, despite the higher 
public spending. Welfare is also lower (due to the growth effect, despite the higher 
consumption-to-capital ratio). 
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At first sight it might seem surprising that in the decentralized economy a rise in ηc  is 
associated with a higher endogenous growth rate. On closer inspection it is possible that 
households postpone current for future consumption, which boosts saving and provides an 
impact to the growth rate. This is in fact what happens as is clear from the expression given 
by (15) where y  is only a function of z , and given that g  is fixed, the growth rate can also be 
expressed in terms of z = Kg /K  only: Γ = Ag[(1−α )+αzρ ]−1/ρ −δ g . A decline in z  raises 
the growth rate by increasing the marginal productivity of capital (due to the complementarity 
between public and private capital). As households rise saving (K ), z  in fact declines. 
 
While the effects of the consumption externalities on welfare and growth in the social 
optimum roughly correspond to those in the decentralized economy, Table 2 displays one 
important difference. Households in the decentralized economy have a tendency to 
overaccumulate capital corresponding to higher values of ηk  (due to their concern for relative 
wealth). The central planner, in an effort to correct this externality, picks a growth rate that 
reduces the rate of capital accumulation.  
 
3.3 Link between Optimal Taxation, Growth and Welfare 
 
In Table 1, Panel A, the decentralized income tax rate (which is =0) is above the rate τˆ y  
(which is <0): so the private return on capital falls below its socially optimal return. In this 
case, a positive tax on consumption helps offset this deviation by raising the private return to 
capital relative to consumption. Consequently, higher ηc , which implies that τˆ y  becomes 
even lower (a larger value in absolute terms) results in even larger divergence between private 
and social returns, and therefore calls for an even larger value of the consumption tax rate to 
compensate. This in turn implies a higher growth rate, which has a positive effect on welfare. 
In Table 1, Panel B, note that the decentralized income tax rate (=0) is below τˆ y : so the 
private return on capital exceeds its social return and a consumption subsidy corrects this 
deviation by lowering the private return on capital relative to consumption. Consequently, 
higher ηk  (which implies that the benchmark rate becomes even higher (a larger positive 
value) results in even larger divergence between private and social returns, and therefore calls 
for an even larger value of the consumption subsidy to compensate. This also implies that the 
growth rate falls with ηk , which has a negative effect on welfare. 
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4. Fiscal Policy Experiments 
 
The panels of Table 3 report the long-run impact of five fiscal policy shocks, PS1 – PS5, on 
equilibrium growth rates and welfare levels in the decentralized economy. PS1 – PS3 pertain 
to an increase in g from 5% to 8% of GDP. For PS1 the increase in g is financed by an 
increase in lump-sum taxes (with τ c = τ y = 0 ). PS2 considers a simultaneous increase in g 
and an increase in the income tax rate, τ y , from zero to 3%. Likewise PS3 considers a 
simultaneous increase in g and an increase in the consumption tax rate, τ c , from zero to 3%. 
The last two policy shocks relate to the replacement of the lump-sum tax as a means of 
financing the benchmark rate of government spending ( g = 0.05 ) by introducing an income 
tax, τ y = 0.03  (PS4) and a consumption tax, τ c = 0.03  (PS5). In our discussion below, we 
will focus on growth and welfare implications respectively of a gradual increase in ηc , 
keeping ηk = 0  (Panel A in Table 3), and a gradual increase in ηk , keeping ηc = 0  (Panel B 
in Table 3). 
 
4.1  Growth and Welfare Effects along the Balanced Growth Path 
 
We report the growth- and welfare effects of the five fiscal policy experiments in the table 
below. In the first two rows of both panels A and B we report the initial (pre-policy) values of 
the growth rate and welfare. In the policy experiments, we report percentage deviations from 
those values. 
 
The effects on growth and welfare for PS1 to PS3 are driven by the strong effect of public 
spending, irrespective of whether or not part of the additional government spending is 
financed by income- or consumption taxation. As the table shows, the gradual increase in ηc  
or ηk  does not have a pronounced influence on the magnitude of the growth- and welfare 
effects. Clearly, the production externality dominates the consumption externalities. 
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Table 3. Growth and welfare effects along the BGP for different fiscal policy 
experiments 
Panel A. 
ηk = 0, ξ = 0.5  
ηc = 0   ηc = 0.1  ηc = 0.2  ηc = 0.3  ηc = 0.4  ηc = 0.5  
Pre-policy initial Γ   0.0166 0.0168 0.0171 0.0174 0.0177 0.0180 
                  initial W -138.34 -108.92 -85.68 -67.33 -52.87 -41.48 
PS1  % change in Γ   +178.2 +179.0 +179.9 +180.8 +181.8 +182.8 
       % change in W  +62.91 +60.71 +58.39 +55.94 +53.34 +50.60 
PS2  % change in Γ   +174.4 +175.3 +176.2 +177.1 +178.1 +179.2 
       % change in W  +63.21 +60.98 +58.63 +56.13 +53.49 +50.69 
PS3  % change in Γ   +180.4 +181.2 +182.1 +182.9 +183.9 +184.8 
       % change in W  +62.72 +60.54 +58.24 +55.82 +53.25 +50.54 
PS4  % change in Γ   -1.80 -1.78 -1.77 -1.76 -1.74 -1.72 
       % change in W  +0.75 +0.64 +0.54 +0.43 +0.31 +0.19 
PS5  % change in Γ   +1.46 +1.45 +1.44 +1.42 +1.41 +1.40 
       % change in W  -0.63 -0.54 -0.45 -0.36 -0.27 -0.17 
Panel B. 
ηc = 0, ξ = 0.5  
ηk = 0  ηk = 0.1  ηk = 0.2  ηk = 0.3  ηk = 0.4  ηk = 0.5  
Pre-policy initial Γ   0.0166 0.0167 0.0168 0.0170 0.0171 0.0172 
                  initial W -138.34 -141.09 -143.95 -146.96 -150.11 -153.42 
PS1  % change in Γ   +178.2 +178.6 +179.0 +179.5 +179.9 +180.3 
       % change in W  +62.91 +62.51 +62.10 +61.66 +61.19 +60.70 
PS2  % change in Γ   +174.4 +174.8 +175.3 +175.7 +176.2 +176.6 
       % change in W  +63.21 +62.83 +62.43 +62.01 +61.56 +61.08 
PS3  % change in Γ   +180.4 +180.8 +181.2 +181.6 +182.1 +182.5 
       % change in W  +62.72 +62.32 +61.90 +61.45 +60.97 +60.46 
PS4  % change in Γ   -1.80 -1.79 -1.78 -1.78 -1.77 -1.76 
       % change in W  +0.75 +0.78 +0.81 +0.84 +0.87 +0.90 
PS5  % change in Γ   +1.46 +1.45 +1.45 +1.44 +1.44 +1.43 
       % change in W  -0.63 -0.66 -0.68 -0.71 -0.73 -0.76 
 
The rise in g  strongly positively affects both growth and welfare. The positive impact on 
growth is evident from the fact that endogenous growth is generated by public spending, 
which complements private spending. The positive impact on welfare stems from the fact that 
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the pre-policy level of government spending is well below the optimal level. E.g., the optimal 
level of g equals 0.1528 (see Table 1, Panel A). 
 
For PS4 and PS5 the impact on growth and welfare is rather small, which can immediately be 
attributed to the fact that in these two policy experiments the production externality from an 
increase in government spending – which was present for PS1 to PS 3 –  is absent.  
 
For PS4 The effect on the growth rate is negative, which is intuitive. A higher income tax rate 
reduces the private rate of return on capital, and there is no complementary increase in public 
capital spending. Regarding the welfare effect, a rise in the income tax rate to finance the 
fixed amount of government spending implies a lowering of lump-sum taxes, which can lead 
to a rise in consumption. Our numerical results show that in this case not only is there a rise in 
the consumption-capital ratio but this rise also outweighs the negative growth effect resulting 
from a rise in income taxes leading to a rise in welfare. 
 
For PS5 the effect on the growth rate is positive, which is intuitive. A higher consumption tax 
rate discourages consumption and raises the relative return on private capital, and thereby 
encourages saving and boosts growth. Regarding the welfare effect, a rise in the consumption 
tax directly affects consumption, and tends to reduce it. On the other hand, higher 
consumption taxes to finance the fixed amount of government spending imply a lowering of 
lump-sum taxes, which can lead to a rise in consumption. Our numerical results show that in 
this case, not only is there a fall in the consumption-capital ratio but this fall also outweighs 
the positive growth effect resulting from a rise in consumption taxes, and this leads to an 
overall decrease in welfare. 
 
4.2 Transitional Dynamics 
 
Finally, we consider the transitional dynamics of the five policy shocks. Specifically, we 
consider the transitional paths of  (c, z)  as well as those of the growth rates  
(gK ,gKg ,gC ) . To 
solve numerically for the transitional paths, we employ the Mathematica implementation of 
the Relaxation Algorithm (Trimborn et al., 2008). 
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Figures 1 and 2 contain grids of graphs displaying the transitional effects of PS1 to PS5 on c 
and z (Figure 1) as well as on the growth rates of  C ,  K , and  
Kg  (Figure 2). Both figures 
show the results for  ηc =ηk = 0 .
17 
 
Figure 1. Transitional dynamics of  (zt ,ct )  under the policy shocks PS1 to PS5 
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Note: In these simulations,  ηi = 0 . For different values of  ηi , the transitional dynamics are similar. 
 
Along the transitional paths, we observe three robust patterns.18 First, for all investigated 
policy shocks, the transitional paths of  
(c, z,gK ,gKg ,gC )  are monotone. As the dynamic 
system of the decentralized economy is characterized by one differential equation of state 
variable z and by one differential equation of jump variable c, we essentially expect 
transitional paths of these variables to be monotone. 
 
Second, for PS1 to PS3, both c and z change “strongly” along the transitional path, while for 
PS4 and PS5 the policy impact on the transitional paths of these variables is small. This 
behavior becomes clear when considering the steady state effects of the policy shocks on c 
and z. As discussed above, the steady state effects of PS4 and PS5 are minor. Also, as the 
                                                
17 Figures for the transitional paths for  (ηc ,ηk ) = (0.5,0); (ηc ,ηk ) = (0,0.5)  are available from the authors upon 
request. These figures, though, are similar to the ones presented here. 
18 These patterns also occur for all other parameter constellations we simulated. In particular, these patterns also 
hold true for different values of  ηi . 
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transitional paths are monotone, we conclude that the effects of PS4 and PS5 on the 
transitional paths of c and z must be minor as well.  
 
Third, focusing on a tax reform with g being unchanged, the transitional dynamics (and steady 
state) effects of PS4 are opposite to those of PS5.  
PS4. Consider a rise in  
τ y  with  (g,τ c )  constant. Initially, the net-return on savings declines, 
and individuals respond with an upwards jump in consumption (thereby  c ). Initially,  z , being 
a state variable, does not change. The lowering in savings lowers  K . Both  
(K , Kg )  still grow 
at a positive rate. But  
gKg > gK  as the former is directly proportional to output, while the 
latter is reduced by a rising  c  (cf. (5) and (6)). Consequently z starts to increase. The rise in 
 z , lowers the rate of interest. Subsequently individuals lower the growth rate of consumption, 
as seen in the modified Keynes-Ramsey rule (14) due to a still lower net return on savings. As 
a consequence, private capital starts to accumulate at a rate higher than initially, just after the 
introduction of the policy shock, towards its new steady state level. In the BGP, though  gK  is 
still below its pre-policy level, as discussed in the previous subsection. 
 
PS5. Consider a rise in  τ c  with  
(g,τ y )  constant. Initially, the net-return on saving increases 
as income is taxed while consumption is not taxed. That is, initially, individuals respond with 
a downward jump in consumption (thereby  c ). The initial rise in savings increases the growth 
rate of private capital (initial upwards jump). As the growth rate of public capital is initially 
fixed (cf. (5)),  
gKg < gK , and z starts to decline. Thus, the rate of interest rises, and so does  
the growth rate of consumption, due to (14). As a consequence, the growth rate of private 
capital declines towards its new steady state level. Both, along the transitional path and in the 
new BGP,  gK  is above its pre-policy level. As a consequence,  Y  increases and the growth 
rate of public capital rises towards its new BGP-level. In the post-policy BGP, the 
endogenous growth rate is higher than in the pre-policy BGP (see previous subsection).  
 
The transitional effects of the policy shocks on the growth rates (as discussed above) are 
shown in Figure 2. Along the transitional paths  
(K , Kg ,C)  grow at differing rates.  
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Figure 2. Transitional dynamics of  
(gKt ,gKgt ,gCt )  under the policy shocks PS1 to PS5 
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t
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Note: In these simulations,  ηi = 0 . For different values of  ηi , the transitional dynamics are similar. 
 
 
5. Conclusions 
 
This paper contributes to the literature on positional preferences by introducing conspicuous 
wealth in the agent’s utility function, in addition to conspicuous consumption. And it does so 
within an endogenous growth set-up where the engine of growth is public capital. Production 
externalities have been captured extensively in much of the growth literature, but the same 
cannot be said about consumption externalities. And even when the latter have been 
considered, the reference level has mostly been conspicuous consumption rather than wealth. 
Our paper attempts to plug this gap, given that one objective in foregoing current 
consumption and accumulating capital, which increases wealth, is that this in itself adds to 
agents’ utility. Also, in the process of enhancing wealth, individual wealth relative to the 
average is considered as an argument in the utility function. 
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In the paper we demonstrate that if wealth is present in the consumer’s utility function, then –
despite labor supply being inelastic – the consumption externality does have a distortionary 
effect, irrespective of the production externality. This modifies the previous results from some 
endogenous growth models where, with inelastic labor supply, such distortionary effects are 
obtained only with production externalities. Interestingly, in our framework, if wealth is not 
present in the consumer’s utility function, this distortion disappears. In some sense, this result 
resembles those in models with conspicuous consumption (but not wealth), where there are no 
distortions; however, such models are typically neoclassical rather than endogenous growth 
models. While the effects of consumption externalities on growth and welfare in the 
decentralized economy broadly correspond to those in the social optimum, the effect of 
wealth externalities is to cause over-accumulation of capital by households in the 
decentralized economy. Here the social planner, in an effort to correct this externality, picks a 
growth rate that reduces the rate of capital accumulation to optimal levels. We also conduct 
some fiscal policy experiments where our results demonstrate that where an increase in public 
spending occurs, this positively and strongly affects both growth and welfare in the steady 
state and along the transition path: here the production externality clearly dominates the 
consumption externalities. 
 
We have performed our analysis in the context of a closed economy, following much of the 
literature. Our paper could be extended to an open economy context – either a small open 
economy that has to take the world interest rate as given, or a large economy where economic 
policies would determine the domestic interest rate – where consumption and wealth 
externalities could be generated not only at home but also abroad. This would add an 
interesting new dimension to the growth and welfare analysis that we have conducted thus far, 
and make our analysis richer. To our knowledge, there have not yet been many studies that 
proceed in this direction: Fisher and Hof (2005) provides an attempt. 
 
Also, the standard growth models typically consider a constant rate of time preference, but 
recently a “preference-driven theory of economic growth” has been proposed by Strulik 
(2012), among others, where the rate of impatience varies negatively with wealth, i.e., as 
wealth increases, individuals tend to become more patient. Given that in our existing set-up, 
the inclusion of wealth and conspicuous wealth in the utility function makes a significant 
difference to the workings of the baseline model (where positional preferences are defined 
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with respect to consumption alone), the introduction of wealth-driven time preference will 
surely introduce another interesting element in the determination of growth and welfare. We 
have made some progress in both these directions, but they would obviously be the subject of 
other papers and beyond the scope of the current one. 
 
 
Appendix 
 
Proof of Proposition 1.   Part (1). From differential equations (14) and (15), the steady state 
values  (c, z)  cannot be explicitly derived. However, at  !c = !z = 0 , both differential equations 
can be analytically solved for  c  as a function of  z . Let  cc(z)  denote this solution associated 
with (14) and  cz(z)  denote the solution associated with (15). Furthermore, let 
 Δ(z) ≡ cc(z)− cz(z) . Obviously, at a steady state  Δ(z) = 0 . We first note that 
 
Δ '(z) = −
B1 B2+ z 1−α( ) Aρ 1− g( )ξ +α A z−ρ 1−α( ) +α( )−1/ρ⎛⎝ ⎞⎠
ρ
1+ ρ( )⎛
⎝⎜
⎞
⎠⎟
⎛
⎝
⎜
⎞
⎠
⎟
z2 1+ −1+ zρ( )α( ) 1+ ξ + γ −1+ηc + −1+ηk( )ξ( )( ) < 0,
B1≡ A1−ρ z−ρ 1−α( ) +α( )−1/ρ > 0,
B2 ≡ Aρg zρα 1+ ξ + γ −1+ηc + −1+ηk( )ξ( )( ) > 0.
  (29) 
That is, the slope of  Δ(z)  is strictly negative. As a consequence, a steady state, if it exists, is 
unique. We now argue that  Δ(0) > 0  and  Δ(1) < 0 . Then, by the Intermediate value theorem 
(and by strict monotonicity), there exists a unique, strictly positive  z ∈(0,1)  for which 
 Δ(z) = 0 . Furthermore, 
 
 
Δ(0) = 1+ ξ −γ 1−ηc + 1−ηk( )ξ( )( )
≥0
! "##### $#####
Ag −δ g 1−α( )
1
ρ
⎛
⎝⎜
⎞
⎠⎟
>0by(A.2)
! "### $###
+ 1−α( )
1
ρ β +δ k 1+ ξ( )( )
>0
! "### $####
> 0,
Δ(1) = − α A−δ k − β( )
>0by(A.1)
! "## $##
−ξ A 1− g( )−δ k( )
≥0
! "## $##
− 1+ ξ + γ −1+ηc + −1+ηk( )ξ( )( )
≥0
! "##### $#####
δ g − Ag( )
≥0by(A.2)
! "# $#
< 0
  
As can easily be seen, (A.1) and (A2) imply  Δ(0) > 0  and  Δ(1) < 0 .  
 
Part (2). The determinant of the Jacobian matrix, evaluated at the steady state, is 
unambiguously negative: 
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−
B3 B2+ z 1−α( ) Aρ 1− g( )ξ +α A z−ρ 1−α( ) +α( )−1/ρ⎛⎝ ⎞⎠
ρ
1+ ρ( )⎛
⎝⎜
⎞
⎠⎟
⎛
⎝
⎜
⎞
⎠
⎟
z 1+ −1+ zρ( )α( ) 1−γ 1−ηc( )( ) < 0,
B3≡ A1−ρc z−ρ 1−α( ) +α( )−1/ρ > 0.
  
Therefore one eigenvalue is positive and the other eigenvalue of the dynamic system is 
negative. As we have one predetermined variable,  z , and one jump variable,  c , the steady 
state is a saddle point and saddle path stable.  
 
Proof of Proposition 2.   As  
 
 
Γ = g y / z −δ g = gA α z
ρ + (1−α )⎡⎣ ⎤⎦
−1/ρ
−δ g , 
the endogenous growth rate negatively depends on z: 
 
Γ( z
(− )
) . In what follows, we graphically 
analyze the impact of a rise of  ηi  on the steady state value of z. Specifically, we consider the 
 cc(z) - and  cz(z) -loci (as defined in the proof of Proposition 1) in  (z,c) -plane. 
 
 
cz(z) = (1− g)y − g( y / z)+ (δ g −δ k ),
cz(0) = − Ag(1−α )−1/ρ −δ g⎡⎣ ⎤⎦ −δ k < 0,
cz(1) = A(1− g)−δ k⎡⎣ ⎤⎦ − ( Ag −δ g ) > 0.
  
 cz(0)  is strictly negative ( cz(1)  is strictly positive) by Assumption (A.2). As  y  is increasing 
in  z , and  ( y / z)  is decreasing in  z , the slope of the  cz(z) -locus is strictly positive in  (z,c) -
plane. Notice that the  cz(z) -locus is independent of the preference parameters  ηi .    
The  cc(z) -locus is given by 
 
 
cc(z;ηc ,ηk ) = (1− g)y −δ k⎡⎣ ⎤⎦
≥0
! "## $##
E1(ηc ,ηk )+ (1−τ y )YK −δ k − β⎡⎣ ⎤⎦
>0 by(A.1)
! "### $###
E2(ηc ,ηk ),
E1(ηc ,ηk ) =
ξγ (1−ηk )−1+ γ (1−ηc )
ξγ (1−ηk )−1+ γ (1−ηc )−ξ(1+τ c )
,
E2(ηc ,ηk ) =
1
ξγ (1−ηk )−1+ γ (1−ηc )−ξ(1+τ c )
,
  
where the auxiliary terms  E1  and  E2  depend only on parameters. For  z = 0 , 
 cc(0;ηc ,ηk ) > cz(0) , as shown in the proof of Proposition 1. That is, at the unique steady state, 
the  cc(z) - locus crosses the  cz(z) -locus from above. In other words, at the unique steady 
state, the (positive or negative) slope of the  cc(z) - locus is lower than the (positive) slope of 
the  cz(z) -locus in  (z,c) -plane.  
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For any given  z , a rise in  ηi  lowers (raises)  
E j , j = 1,2  if  γ < 0  (if  γ > 0 ). That is,  
 
 
sgn
∂E j
∂ηi
= sgnγ , i∈ c,k{ }, j ∈ 1,2{ }  . 
If  γ < 0 , which is overwhelmingly suggested by empirical evidence, a rise in  ηi  makes the 
 cc(z) -locus shift downwards. As a consequence, the steady state value of z decreases. As 
 
Γ( z
(− )
) , the endogenous growth rate increases as of a rise in  ηi . 
 
Welfare.   Regardless of whether we consider a decentralized economy or a centralized 
framework, along a BGP (where  c  is constant and  K  grows at the constant rate Γ ), welfare 
is given by: 
 
 
W0 =
1
γ0
∞
∫ C1−ηc K ξ (1−ηk )⎡⎣ ⎤⎦
γ
e−βtdt = 1
γ
C (1−ηc )γ K γ ξ (1−ηk )e−βt
0
∞
∫ dt =
1
γ
c(1−ηc )γ K (1−ηc )γ +γ ξ (1−ηk )e−βt
0
∞
∫ dt
= c
(1−ηc )γ
γ
K (1−ηc )γ +γ ξ (1−ηk )e−βt
0
∞
∫ dt =
c(1−ηc )γ
γ
K0
(1−ηc )γ +γ ξ (1−ηk )e (1−ηc )γ +γ ξ (1−ηk )⎡⎣ ⎤⎦Γ te−βt
0
∞
∫ dt
=
K0
(1−ηc )γ +γ ξ (1−ηk )c(1−ηc )γ
γ
e− β−γ Γ (1−ηc )+ξ (1−ηk )( )⎡⎣ ⎤⎦ t
0
∞
∫ dt =
c(1−ηc )γ
γ
e− β−γ Γ (1−ηc )+ξ (1−ηk )( )⎡⎣ ⎤⎦ t
0
∞
∫ dt,
  
where the last line follows from the initial condition  K0 = 1. This expression is defined only if 
 
β −γ Γ (1−ηc )+ξ(1−ηk )( )⎡⎣ ⎤⎦> 0 . Noting (10), this inequality is equivalent with the 
transversality condition  limt→∞ λt Kte
−βt . As the transversality condition is required to hold at 
a solution to the optimization problem, we find the welfare expression 
 
 
W0 =
c(1−ηc )γ
γ β −γ Γ (1−ηc )+ξ(1−ηk )( )⎡⎣ ⎤⎦
, 
where  c  and  Γ(z)  are implicitly given. 
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